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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NAMVAR TAGHIPOUR, and : 
DANESH RAHEMI, M.D., individuals and 
JEREZ, TAGHIPOUR AND ASSOCIATIONS,: 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff and Appellants, : Case No. 20000047-CA 
v. 
EDGAR C. JEREZ, an individual, and : Priority No. 13 
MOUNT OLYMPUS FINANCIAL, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing all claims against Mount 
Olympus Financial, L.C., in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues: Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Appellants' 
Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief? Specifically, was Mt. 
Olympus completely insulated from any due diligence requirements, under 
either tort or statutory law theories, to check out the bona fides of a Limited 
Liability Company manager by U.C.A. §48-2b-127(2) (1998)? Was the 
District Court correct in dismissing Appellants' claim for partition when 
Appellee undeniably benefited from a payment on the property made by 
Appellants after the foreclosure? 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court treats a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal as a legal ruling and therefore grants no deference to the lower court. 
The appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and the facts are 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the losing party below. Sperry v. 
Sperry, 1999 UT 101, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 27. 
"A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court 
only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of its claim" Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT 
App. 36,1J9, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd„ 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
"Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claims, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of 
the pleader be made by motion: .. .(6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted,..." 
U.C.A. §48-2b-125 (1998): 
(l)(b) If the management of the limited liability company is 
vested in the members, any member has authority to bind the 
limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement. 
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(2)(b) If the management of the limited liability company is 
vested in a manager or managers, any manager has authority to 
bind the limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in 
the articles of organization or operating agreement. 
U.C.A. §48-2b-127(1998) 
(2) Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, 
mortgage or disposition of property of the limited liability 
company shall be valid and binding upon the limited liability 
company if they are executed by one or more managers of a 
limited liability company having a manager or managers or if 
they are executed by one or more members of a limited liability 
company in which management has been retained by the 
members. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants are some of the individuals who formed a limited liability 
company ("the LC") and the LC itself. The purpose of the LC was to purchase 
and develop a parcel of real estate under a joint venture agreement. The 
Articles of Incorporation of the LC listed Defendant Edgar Jerez as the 
manager of the LC.1 
The Operating Agreement of the LC provided that no loan could be 
contracted on behalf of the LC without a resolution by the members. Without 
obtaining the required approval and without the knowledge or consent of the 
other members of the LC, Jerez entered into a loan agreement on behalf of the 
LC with Appellee, Mt. Olympus. Jerez gave Mt. Olympus a Deed of Trust to 
the LC's property to secure a Trust Deed Note for $25,000.00. Mt. Olympus 
1
 All of these facts are found in the Appellant's complaint (R. 1-8) and must be 
taken as true. 
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did absolutely no due diligence of any kind to determine the propriety of 
Jerez's actions on behalf of the LC. 
Mt. Olympus disbursed to Jerez only $20,000.00 of the loan keeping 
$5,000 as an origination fee, points or some other financing inducement. Jerez 
pocketed the loan money for himself and then defaulted by failing to make any 
payments. The other members of the LC, including Appellants, never received 
any notices of the default or of the pending foreclosure sale. Appellants even 
continued to make payments on the promissory note to the underlying 
landowners of the property. 
Mt. Olympus foreclosed on the property. Even after the Mt. Olympus 
foreclosure, the Appellants made a payment on the promissory note to the 
underlying landowner of the property. That landowner turned the payment 
over to Mt. Olympus. Only after the foreclosure sale did the Appellants learn 
that the property had been mortgaged by Jerez to obtain the loan. 
The Appellants filed an action in the Third District Court (R. 1-8), 
Appellees moved to dismiss (R. 15-19) and granted by the trial court (R. 59-
61). Appellants appealed the motion to dismiss (R. 63-64). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Limited Liability Company Act contains a conflict regarding 
the authority of a manager or member to bind the limited liability company to 
third-parties in conflict with the internal operating agreement of the company. 
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The Court should construe the Act, or recognize a common law requirement, to 
require a party in a commercial loan setting to conduct at least minimal due 
diligence to determine the corporate authority of a manager or member under 
the articles of incorporation and/or the operating agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MT. OLYMPUS HAS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE DILIGENCE 
UNDER TORT AND STATUTORY LAW THEORIES. 
A. For a motion to dismiss to survive it requires that no legal basis for 
recovery exist. 
"When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an 
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true, 
and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears the 
complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Mackey 
v. Cannon, 2000 UT App. 36,1J9, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084. 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals require a strong showing by the moving party, 
and are inherently disfavored. "A motion to dismiss is properly granted only in 
cases in which, even if the "factual assertions in the complaint were correct, 
they provided no legal basis for recovery." Id. at ^|13, 1085, (citing Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 670 (Utah 1989). 
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B. Utah's limited liability company act as originally enacted allowed 
any member to bind the company. 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Limited Liability Company Act 
at U.C.A. §48-2b-101 et. seq. in 1991. In the 1991 statute, there were two 
sections that dealt with binding a limited liability company. The first section 
was §48-2b-125 which had two parts dealing with the ability of members to 
bind the limited liability company. The first part stated if the management of 
the limited liability company is vested in the members, "the members shall 
have the authority to bind the limited liability company." 1991 Laws of Utah 
998. Part two of the statute stated that "[i]f the management of the limited 
liability company is vested in a manager or manager, "the manager or 
managers shall have the authority to bind the limited liability company." id. 
The second section from the Limited Liability Company Act that dealt 
with binding the limited liability company was §48-2b-127 that dealt with the 
ownership and disposition of property. That statute indicated that 
"[instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or 
disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and 
binding upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or more 
managers of a limited liability company having a manager or managers..." M. 
at 999. 
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C. Section §48-2b-125 of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act was 
amended to restrict the ability of members to bind the company. Section 
§48-2b has no such restriction. 
I 
In 1992, the legislature amended the Utah Limited Liability Company 
Act by enacting House Bill 387. 1992 Laws of Utah 655. Section 8 of that bill 
amended the authority of members and managers to bind a company in both 
sections one and two of §48-2b-125 by allowing them to bind the company, 
"unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization." In 1996, Senate 
Bill 64, amended the section again to include "or operating agreement". 1996 
Laws of Utah 577. 
Though there was no debate in 1992 or 1996 explaining why the statute 
was amended to add this restriction on binding the company, the plain 
language itself demonstrates recognition that it was intended that the operating 
agreement (or now articles of organization) can serve as a restriction on the 
members ability to bind the limited liability company, where before 1992, any 
member or members could bind the limited liability company. 
No such amendments have been made to U.C.A. §48-2b-127 (1998). It 
has not been amended since its enactment in 1991. The two statutes now differ 
in whether they allow a manager to bind the limited liability company if the 
operating agreement specifies otherwise. 
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D. The two statutes can be read in harmony, so that one does not nullify 
the other. 
Even though the two statutory sections, U.C.A. §48-2b-125 (1998) and 
U.C.A. §48-2b-127(2) (1998) now differ, they can still be read in harmony 
with each other. 
"Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language is the rule 
"that a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its provisions 
construed to be harmonious with each other and with the overall 
legislative objective of the statute." Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, 1999 
Utah App. 342, [^17 footnote 7, 995 P.2d 7, 12 citing Nixon v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
In U.C.A. §48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) the manager is given authority to 
bind the limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
organization or operating agreement, and U.C.A. §48-2b-127(2) (1998) allows 
a manager to sign an instrument of mortgage. To read the two sections in 
harmony and according to the purpose of the statute requires that a manager be 
properly authorized to bind the limited liability company in all situations, 
including signing for a mortgage or any other documents that may affect 
property interest of the limited liability company. 
Otherwise, if the two statutory sections are not read together, a manager 
could sign any of the instruments and documents listed in U.C.A. §48-2b-
127(2) (1998) without being authorized by the operating agreement, but would 
need to be authorized by the operating agreement to sign anything else 
according to U.C.A. §48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998). The documents listed in §48-
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2b-127 have the greatest potential for damage to a limited liability company 
because they are encumbering the property of the limited liability company, so 
those are the documents where it is imperative that the person signing the 
document be authorized to do so. 
As well, .. ."any interpretation of statutory language that would nullify 
other statutory provisions is improper" Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, 1999 
Utah App. 342, ^17 footnote 7, 995 P.2d 7, 12 citins State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 
230, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If U.C.A. §48-2b-127(2) (1998) is read not to 
require a manager be bound by the terms of an operating agreement, then it 
would render the provisions of U.C.A. §48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998) "unless 
otherwise provided by the operating agreement or articles of incorporation" 
unnecessary. 
E. Requiring that someone be authorized to sign as an agent before 
encumbering company assets is not unduly burdensome. 
Because the statute requires that a manager be authorized before binding 
a limited liability company, lenders should also check to make sure that a 
manager is authorized to sign on behalf of a company. Lenders currently have 
to verify all types of information before lending money including verifying 
employment, verifying title, verifying worth of collateral. Verifying that a 
person is authorized to sign on behalf of a corporation in order to protect their 
investment is not too burdensome a task. 
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F. Other business entities require that third parties verify that a person is 
authorized to act as an agent on behalf of a company, either with apparent 
or actual authority. 
Whether a lending institution has a duty to verify that a manager of a 
limited liability company has the authority to bind the company is a case of 
first impression in Utah. In looking at other types of Utah business entities, 
under partnership law, "[t]he burden of proof as to the partner's authority [to 
bind the partnership] is on the party seeking to enforce the transaction." 
Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd. 855 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah 1993). In Luddington, 
a general partner secured loans through a trust deed on a piece of property that 
the partnership owned without the knowledge of the limited partners. Under 
the law of corporations, in a case determining whether the law firm of a 
corporation was an agent of the corporation, this Court said "[f]or example, no 
officer or agent of a corporation has authority to bind the firm in a real estate 
deal without a board resolution." Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McKonkie and 
Bushnell 789 P.2d 34, 38, footnote 6 (Utah App. 1990). 
If lenders dealing with corporate and partnership entities in Utah already 
are required to verify that an agent have actual or apparent authority to bind the 
entity, then requiring the same for the limited liability company entity is not an 
undue burden on a lender. "Common law concepts of agency apply with 
respect to LLC's to the same extent and in the same manner in which those 
10 
principles apply with respect to any other legal person" Nicholas G. 
Karambelas, Limited Liability Companies, §5:07 (April 1999). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS INCORRECT IN DISMISSING 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR PARTITION WHEN APPELLEE 
UNDENIABLY BENEFITED FROM PAYMENT ON THE 
PROPERTY MADE BY APPELLANTS AFTER THE 
FORECLOSURE. 
An action for partition is allowed by U.C.A. §78-39-1 et. seq. (1996), 
and the "rights of the several parties, plaintiff as well as defendant, may be put 
in issue, tried and determined by such action..." U.C.A. §78-39-8 (1996). 
Appellee benefited from the payments made on the property by 
Appellants to the underlying owner of the property after Olympus had 
foreclosed on the mortgage when the underlying owner of the property turned 
over the payment to Mt. Olympus. 
If partition is not found to be an appropriate remedy for return of 
payment made after foreclosure, unjust enrichment may also be an alternative. 
The unjust enrichment "doctrine is designed to provide an equitable remedy 
where one does not exist at law." American Towers Owners. 930 P.2d 1182, 
1192. (Utah 1996). 
Unjust enrichment requires that three elements be proved: 
" '(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation 
or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
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payment of its value.1 " Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 
1998) citing American Towers Owners, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192. (Utah 
1996). 
In the current case, there was a benefit conferred from the Appellants to 
the Appellees when they made a payment thus reducing the overall balance 
owing. This should have demonstrated to Appellees that Appellants had no 
knowledge of the impending foreclosure action. It would be inequitable to 
allow Appellants to keep the payment when they have already had the benefit 
of the foreclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
The case of whether a manager can bind a limited liability company if 
the operating agreement specifies otherwise is a case of first impression in 
Utah. There are conflicting Utah statutory provisions that need to be construed 
and harmonized. If a manger is found to be bound by the terms of the 
operating agreement or principles of agency, a reversal of the foreclosure 
action or quiet title action is a potential legal basis for recovery which should 
preclude a motion to dismiss. As such, Appellants respectfully request that this 
Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of this action and remand the matter to 
the District Court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this / day-oHj j^ 
BRltefi R. BAIRD 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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